We build on previous work to present an efficient protocol for two or more parties holding certificates to identify a common set of valid certifiers without revealing any information about the other certificates. We optimize our protocol by performing signature verification using authenticated shares and set intersection using garbled circuits.

We present and prove security of a protocol for two clients to securely authenticate to an AWS server. We describe how this enables very efficient secure computation by off-loading heavy computation to the cloud. We use MP-SDPZ for implementing TLS-in-MPC and encrypting web requests.

We provide an investigation of secure multiparty computation with information theoretic security and sublinear communication complexity in the presence of semi-honest and malicious mobile adversaries with erasures. We prove bounds on the corruptions that can be tolerated, which we also show to be essentially optimal.

We engineer and analyze random walk attacks on state-of-the-art watermarking schemes in different entropy settings. To support our claims, we present experimental evidence obtained by watermarking open-source models such as Mixtral.